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perhaps it is time to throw the book aside, as having had its day, and start
again on something new.
-Doris Lessingi
I. INSIDE AND OUT
Chief Justice Rehnquist visited my law school last year to
deliver a lecture entitled "The Future of Federal Courts."2  The
University Theater filled: overdressed alumni in the front rows,
respectful students in the balcony, camouflaged professors here and
there. I sat in the middle and hunched over a folded-up sheet of legal
paper. I scribbled notes and hoped for some insight into the tangled
mass of problems I had made my life's work. Would the Chief Justice
perhaps explain the Court's new habeas corpus jurisprudence? I
wanted a little accounting for Butler v. McKellar,3 in which he had
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. J.D., 1981, New York University School of
Law; B.F.A. 1973, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Barry Friedman for inviting me
to participate in this panel and for his supportive comments on a draft of this piece.
1. Doris Lessing, Introduction to The Golden Notebook at xxii (Bantam, 1973).
2. William H. Rehnquist, speech printed as Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the
Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1.
3. 494 U.S. 407 (1990). This case, along with its predecessor, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), has provoked the greatest outpouring of criticism from federal courts scholars that I can
remember. See Ann Althouse, Saying What Rights Are In and Out of Context, 1991 Wis. L. Rev.
929; James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1997 (1992); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J.
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denied federal court relief to a man who faced the death penalty after
a conviction based on a confession that the Court's own case law
would, without question, exclude.
The Chief told some jokes, elaborated on his ties to Wisconsin,
and discoursed at length about the workload of the courts. The issues
were neutral, administrative, managerial, structural.
"Did he say anything provocative?" asked a colleague who had
missed the speech.
"He never got any more provocative than to say he's against
diversity."
My friend was shocked. "He's against diversity!!??"
"Diversity jurisdiction," I said, realizing she was not a proce-
duralist.
Outside the theater, a group of protesters chanted and banged,
trying to disrupt the speech. They happened to be pro-choice activists,
but they represented all the many persons who have found them-
selves, over the years, aggrieved by the Court's rulings. They had no
way of knowing that, inside, the Chiefs speech was taking a pristinely
procedural track, devoid of any substance capable of sparking protest.
The speech continued calmly, the audience continued to listen, and
only the noise of the protesters intruded on our privileged space.
Mounted on the ceiling of the theater is a long acoustical panel,
with lighting fixtures and decorative strips that seem to form a hu-
man face, a strange character who overlooks whatever proceedings
take place below. I imagined the ceiling face as the collective spirit of
those who had suffered under the force of jurisdictional doctrine,
which seemed so harmless in the hands of our honored speaker, who
had himself devised much of the pristine procedure that caused and
masked suffering.4 The speech continued on the procedural channel,
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1733
(1991); Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 Hastings L. J. 941 (1991); Robert Weisberg, Future
Trends in Criminal Procedure A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. Crim. L. 9 (1990); Marc M.
Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L.
Rev. 371 (1991); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331 (1993); Patrick
E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2433 (1993); Susan Bandes, Taking Justice
to Its Logical Extreme: A Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2453 (1993); Barry
Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 797 (1992); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling
Habeas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 575 (1993).
4. See, for example, Butler, 494 U.S. 407 (defining a *new rule" of constitutional law very
broadly, thus removing a large number of important cases from federal habeas review); Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (restricting standing doctrine in a context that prevented any
review of trial proceedings in a death penalty case); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
(finding Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits for retrospective relief against state officials for
constitutional violations). See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (narrowing the meaning of due process and denying recovery against state actors who
failed to rescue a child from his abusive father). For a decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist
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with the protest noise mere static drifting in from the substantive
channel. The face kept its solemn vigil. I still scrawled my notes,
though I knew I would not receive the accounting I wanted. The
members of the audience seemed to enjoy a strong sense of their
status as insiders. They were in the tasteful theater, in the legal
profession, listening to the highest ranking member of that profession,
looking forward to shaking hands with him at the reception that
would follow at the Edgewater Hotel.
After the Chief Justice finished his speech, the audience filed
out and reassembled in a second cavernous room. The reception room
was neatly arrayed: white-clothed tables, set with scores of water and
wine glasses and white napkins origami'd into absurd peaks. At one
end of the room stood a dais, where the feted Chief soon would bask in
adulation. In the lobby, the crowd of buzzing receptioneers grew.
Rumor had it that the Chiefs car had arrived in the underground
parking garage; soon the lobby elevator would open and he would
begin to circulate through the gracious crowd.
I did not witness the ensuing celebration: I had impulsively
slipped outside and into the twilight. It felt good to leave.
II. THE BUILDING PROJECT
I once wrote a law review article about the Eleventh Amendment5
(haven't we all?). In my quest to explain/unveil/analyze/critique Supreme
Court doctrine, I wrestled with the notion of a legal fiction, as legal
fictions figure quite large in this area of law." I ran across the old Lon
Fuller article, Legal Fictions Fuller, a legal process scholar aligned
with Hart and Wechsler, the authors of our central text,8 conceptual-
that restricts access to federal courts but may reflect genuine recognition of human suffering, see
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (expanding abstention doctrine and excluding broad
constitutional attack on a state statute designed to protect children from abusive parents),
discussed in the text accompanying notes 77-79.
5. Ann Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh
Amendment, 40 Hastings L. J. 1123 (1989).
6. In Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court allowed suit against the Attorney
General of Minnesota to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. Even though the
injunction worked to prevent the state from enforcing the statute and even though there was no
reason to sue the Attorney General other than to have this effect, the Court stated that the
Attorney General somehow ceased to be the state-and thus could not claim Eleventh
Amendment immunity-when he sought to enforce an unconstitutional statute. Moreover, the
Attorney General must be viewed simultaneously as the state (for the Fourteenth Amendment to
apply) and not the state (for the Eleventh Amendment not to apply).
7. 25 IlI. L. Rev. 363, 513, 877 (1930, 1931) (published in 3 parts).
8. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
(Foundation, 1st ed. 1953).
1994] 995
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ized legal fictions as scaffolding around a building under construction.9
Judges have begun the enterprise of building a new legal structure,
but they lack the language and the worked-out logic needed to write a
final, well-reasoned version of the doctrine they sense they need. So
they sketch out a temporary version, to be replaced as experience
produces a new conceptualization of the law: the building within the
scaffolding. Eventually the building will stand and the scaffolding will
be torn down and discarded.
Straining to understand Ex Parte Young, I saw no signs of any
coming coherent doctrine. I saw a doctrine once presented as cogent
reasoning now openly called a legal fiction. 10 It was Lon Fuller's
scaffolding all right. But the scaffolding had no building. Nothing
was even under construction. Indeed, the whole enterprise of
constructing a building had long been abandoned. Young was only a
legal fiction-take it or leave it-just one more ugly landmark in the
field I had chosen to study: not a nice, admirable finished building,
but a gangly, old scaffolding, wobbly and patched in a few quite
noticable places, lacking the dignity to collapse.
We know the ugly landmarks: McCardle" and Klein,12
Younger 3 and Mitchum, 4 Stone v. Powell 5 and Wainwright v. Sykes, 6
Teague"7 and Butler,8 Edelman,9 Pennhurst,20 and Union Gas,2 Los
Angeles v. Lyons.22 And centrally located in this woeful territory, the
9. Fuller, 25 Ill. L. Rev. at 525 (cited in note 7).
10. See, for example, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
11. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (characterizing congressional power over
Supreme Court jurisdiction as complete, regardless of motive).
12. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (rejecting congressional power over Supreme
Court jurisdiction when used as a "means to an end").
13. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (creating an abstention doctrine deferring to state
court capacity to resolve federal law challenges to a state statute).
14. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (straining statutory interpretation to make it
possible to enjoin state courts from enforcing state statutes challenged under federal law, rather
than allowing the state court to determine the federal question).
15. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (denying federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule claims in most cases).
16. 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (allowing state-law procedural defaults to bar federal habeas review
in most cases).
17. 489 U.S. 288 (barring assertion of "new rules" of constitutional law at the habeas stage,
with rare exceptions).
18. 494 U.S. 407 (articulating a broad conception of "new rule" in applying the doctrine
announced in Teague).
19. 415 U.S. 651 (denying the applicability of Ex Parte Young to requests for retrospective
relief against state officials).
20. 465 U.S. 89 (denying the applicability of Ex Parte Young to claims based on state law).
21. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 U.S. 2273 (1989) (addressing the question of the
scope of Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity).
22. 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (examining standing restrictions disabling federal courts from
addressing the problem of fatal police chokeholds).
LATE NIGHT CONFESSIONS
absurd structure of Marbury,2 which we gaze upon for inspiration at
the start of our annual trek through the ruins. Oh yes, we can ridi-
cule and criticize. We become righteously indignant: who among us
has not pointed out the dead bodies at the foundations of some of the
more dangerous structures? But we dutifully make the trek year after
year.
Over time you develop a means of presenting the strange,
unfolding story of the Eleventh Amendment (or standing or abstention
or habeas corpus or whatever you're doing today). You get it to hang
together for the students. You write your article about it, adding your
little spin, your new perspective, your new piece of historical evidence,
your perception of an incoherence or a coherence that nobody else has
perceived quite that way before. Your colleagues ask what you're
writing about, you name the doctrine, and they pronounce it, inevi-
tably, "arcane." You feel more and more marginalized. You're begin-
ning to feel almost perverse with your concentration on threshold
doctrines, forever concerned only with getting into court-permanently
confined to the antechamber, forever denied substance. Sustenance!
It's a watery diet indeed.
Quite a few years ago a prominent District of Columbia Circuit
judge visited my law school: he was going to give a talk about a case
he had just worked on concerning a subtle point of political question
doctrine. He questioned the assembled group about their interest in
federal courts doctrine and appeared astounded that I, a mere assis-
tant professor at the time, was the only one there who worked the
Federal Courts territory. Why, this is the truly fascinating material!
This is where the most powerful legal minds can find the most pro-
found intellectual rewards! This is the very pinnacle of elite scholar-
ship! Had we not heard? Indeed, this is what I thought at the time:
to be a Federal Courts professor was to enjoy special status within the
academy.
Perhaps at some law schools, professors with high aspirations
and high opinions of themselves line up for the chance to teach
Federal Courts, but at my law school nobody else has given a hoot
about teaching Federal Courts for nearly ten years. The faculty will-
ingly granted me the course upon my arrival, as if to say, "Good! You
23. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the Court both asserts the power
(by announcing the power of judicial review and the power to mandamus the President) and
disclaims it (by finding no jurisdiction and conceding that there are some "political" questions left
to the discretion of the President); the Court identifies a fundamental duty to provide a remedy
whenever a right is violated, yet sends Marbury away without a remedy even though it finds his




take it! We don't want any of that nonsense!" A judge who had
taught law at a prestigious East Coast school once said to me, "How
did you get them to let you to teach Federal Courts?" If she only
knew! A colleague of mine, professing no interest whatsoever in what
I had fancied a highly desirable field of study, scoffed: "I knew when I
was a student that Federal Courts was the ultimate law school mind
game!" When I took a year's leave, the school hired a federal magis-
trate to cover the course.
The elite pinnacle seems more and more like a cramped out-
post. Instead of the intellectual leaders of our generation-like Henry
Hart and Herbert Wechsler-we seem like the few surviving adher-
ents to the cult they founded. Here we are at our annual ritual. The
legal edifice where we once felt so privileged has become stultifying.
We may envy our substance-driven colleagues. We may envy the pro-
choice noisemakers outside. They are out in the world and we are
inside out of the world. We have built for ourselves structures of
reason and doctrine and spend our lives inside these structures. Of
course, we know the buildings have flaws; indeed, we make it our
work to search for the flaws, point them out, and propose repairs,
renovations, remodelings, and new additions. But we remain dedi-
cated to the ongoing building project and sense that to abandon it
would be to abandon scholarship.
I confess a certain degree of affection for our structures and
frameworks. I would scarcely confine my thoughts here today in a
structure of metaphorical language if I didn't find structures compel-
ling. In fact, as I write, the structure of my words holds my attention
far more powerfully than any ideas I mean to express. Though I have
rankled when non-Federal Courts colleagues have wisecracked that
this is a course for people who like to do crossword puzzles, I must
admit that our doctrinal and ideological manipulations can become a
sort of intellectual game or puzzle. And I confess that I take pleasure
in solving the complex problems, fitting the words together.
I find satisfaction in teaching and writing about legal concepts
with structural qualities. I also teach the course my school calls
Constitutional Law I; that is, the constitutional law covering the
structural matters of federalism and separation of powers. The issues
of substantive rights are taught by someone else the next semester. A
constitutional scholar in our political science department told me he
would love to teach Con Law at the law school. When I asked whether
he preferred the "rights course" or the "structure course," he re-
sponded instantly, "the rights course." Who wouldn't? Who doesn't
prefer to talk about the meaning of the rights and not the dull old
998 [47:993
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federalism and separation of powers material? I had to confess that I
do! Why should I enjoy shifting about the formless sands of rights
when I can build structures? When I teach I use hand gestures that
betray the intense visualization I haive of ideas as concrete ob-
jects-structure--building blocks. Quite without planning, I move to
different spots in the territory of the classroom stage, as if these spots
are somehow the loci of various ideological constructions.
The metaphor of the building project seems almost inescapable.
We begin with that tract of land we call our "field," and there we
construct and build our arguments and theories.2 4 When I made my
first foray into the field of Federal Courts, an exploration into the
validity of deferring to state courts in the name of federalism, I called
my article "How to Build a Separate Sphere."25 The federal and state
judicial systems seem like distinct structures: I can't help picturing
courthouse buildings. The concept of jurisdiction seems to demand the
use of architectural metaphors like "the threshold" (which tends to get
raised or lowered) and "the courthouse door" (which tends to get
widened, narrowed, or slammed shut).
A casebook itself is architectural: it structures the course, it is
published by Foundation Press. The Hart and Wechsler book 6-that
"monumental landmark" '27-is the foundation upon which the rest of
us build our scholarship. But why do we continue this building pro-
ject? What motivates us?
In the fifties, we genuinely may have shared their vision.2 8
In the sixties, many of us entered into a new phase, spurred on
by an architect-Court that quickly raised new structures, structures
that seemed to need the support of the scholarly community. The
24. For the classic treatment of metaphors in thought processes, see the endlessly useful
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (U. of Chicago, 1980), especially at 47
(stating that "[t]heories (and arguments) are buildings").
25. Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 1485 (1987). The notion was that cases like Michigan v. Long and Pennhurst
informed the states as to how they could construct separate sovereignty for themselves. See
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89. States do not enjoy
immunity from federal intrusion simply because they are states, but by performing in the
prescribed manner, they could claim it; that is, "build a separate sphere" for themselves. Thus,
under Long, if a state court clearly rests its decision on an independent and adequate state
ground, the Supreme Court will not review the case, 463 U.S. 1032, and under Pennhurst, if a
state legislature extends rights to its citizens that go beyond available federal rights, it will be
able to confine litigation about those state-created rights to the state courts, 465 U.S. 89.
26. Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts (cited in note 8).
27. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688, 691 (1989).
28. For a discussion of the scholarship in the Hart and Wechsler casebook's Legal Process
tradition, see generally id.
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rights-driven expansions of federal jurisdiction-Baker v. Carr,29 Fay
v. Noia,30 Henry v. Mississippi,;" Dombrowski v. Pfister32-generated
plentiful work for us then.
In the seventies, outrage may have motivated us: clumsy new
artisan-judges moved onto the scene and staged a slow-down, aban-
doned some of the projects, and threatened to topple key structures. 3
While the pure constructive joy had drained out of our work, there
was passion in the critique and urgency in the preservation project.
The belief that we had seen the Golden Age3 4 still warmed us, and we
remained optimistic about our ability to return to the work of the
Warren Court after this inappropriate, destructive interlude. We
wrote articles to the Burger and Rehnquist Courts pointing out their
mistakes, illuminating their confusion, pointing the way back from
their "wrong turns."35 We thought we could help them understand the
true plans.
The nineties are here now. All of the Justices from the Golden
Age have moved on. The clumsy artisans now fancy themselves archi-
tects. They propose sweeping new plans that scarcely refer to the plan
of the Golden Age. Pointing out deviations from the old plan seems
more and more outmoded. The metaphor of a Court that has simply
taken a "wrong turn" no longer seems descriptive. We might close
ranks and persevere in writing articles demanding a return to the
Warren Court's plan. But over the years this work has grown tire-
29. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (limiting the applicability of political question and standing doctrine,
rendering problems of malapportionment judiciable).
30. 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (limiting the deference of federal habeas corpus to state-law
procedural defaults to instances in which rights claimants "deliberately bypassed" state proce-
dures).
31. 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (limiting Supreme Court deference to state-law procedural defaults
to instances in which rights claimants "deliberately bypassed" state procedures).
32. 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (permitting a federal court to enjoin a state court criminal prosecu-
tion).
33. Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren 212-13 (Simon and Schuster, 1979)
(cartoon showing the Burger Court Justices demolishing a building representing rights).
34. For use of the term "Golden Age" to describe the Warren Era, see George Kannar,
Citizenship and Scholarship, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2017, 2020 (1990); Owen M. Fiss, The Law
Regained, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 245, 249 (1989). See also William N. Eskridge, Metaprocedure, 98
Yale L. J. 945 (1989) (reviewing Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss, and Judith Resnik, Procedure
(Foundation, 1988)) (characterizing Procedure as premised on an idealization of the Warren
Court). I recognize that my use of the term Golden Age to designate the Warren Court Era
conflicts with Professor Amar's use of the term to designate the heyday of the Legal Process
school in his excellent history of the three editions of the Hart and Wechsler casebook. See Amar,
102 Harv. L. Rev. at 691 (cited in note 27). My experience with the law professoriate suggests
that the Warren Court, far more than Legal Process scholarship, generated admiration and
devotion on a deep psychic level. Scholars may have sensed, however, that they ought to express
their admiration in the respectable and legitimating language of Legal Process.
35. See David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst
Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61 (1984).
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some: there is little room for creativity. Moreover, the Golden Age
seems less and less like the True Law and more and more like a his-
torical period, the result of a social context and intellectual fashions
that no longer hold sway. Even if the Court were repopulated with
liberals, one must doubt whether they would simply return to the old
project.
What can motivate us now? Is there not despair? Metaphors
of death and destruction have taken hold, and we say things like, "The
Court has killed habeas corpus!" We suggest symposium topics like
"The Death of Federal Courts." Does anyone think of our blighted
landscape as a place for prime intellectual achievement anymore? Do
we wander like fools through the ruins, raving about a glorious past
that recedes toward the vanishing point?
III. SLIPPING OUT INTO THE TWILIGHT
I began my work in this field about a decade ago, as a teacher,
quite simply, trying to find some coherence, some sense in the notori-
ously complex doctrine. Finding a scheme of coherence, a framework,
really is the process of understanding. To merely observe that the
field is chaotic, arcane, or incoherent is to decline the work of under-
standing. That rejection of the subject matter may be a fair and ap-
propriate reaction: witness my colleagues who regard Federal Courts
as a "mind game" or a "crossword puzzle." (Indeed, vast numbers bf
laypersons have this reaction to the entire subject of law.) But assum-
ing we accept the work of teaching Federal Courts, we must search for
frameworks and coherencies as a necessary means of thinking about
the subject. At the very least, we need heuristic devices.
Over the years I developed a theory, an explanation of the
proper basis for allocating cases to the state and federal courts38 and I
have used this theory in class and in a number of articles. In applying
this theory, I would receive and review the Supreme Court decisions,
hang them out to dry on my framework, and see how they looked. Of
course the decisions themselves provided the basis for the framework:
this is always a two-way process. One could scarcely come up with a
theory of federal courts that had nothing to do with the case law. A
theory is refined out of the case law and other articles that have been
36. The most comprehensive statement of my framework is set forth in Ann Althouse,
Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 953 (1991) (arguing that federal jurisdictional
doctrine, viewing state courts as a resource to be tapped, should defer not to the state's interest in
being left alone to pursue its own policies, but to its capacity to enforce federal rights and to
develop alternative rights in state law).
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refined out of the case law; the case law then is used to support the
theory; the theory is turned back on the case law; and because of the
process of refining the case law, the theory shows why some case law
deserves praise and some demands criticism. This entirely circular,
inbred process has gone on for so long, in so many diverse voices, and
in such lofty and abstract terms that we can regard it as a culture and
feel that it is a rather substantial thing-not at all embarrassing or
ridiculous. So we operate within this culture and can continue to
write articles ad infinitum in this mode.
The legal community is like a dreaming brain that constantly
fires off impulses and then works furiously to resolve the chaos, to
impose the order of a story, to create meaning.3 7 The mind seeks
order, structure: of course, when we read complex material we impose
structures. How else could we read? Of course, when we write we
build structures. How else could we write? But if we -are too nag-
gingly aware that this is just a structure we impose to make sense of
complexity, we, in effect, awaken from the dream. The dream state
imbued our thoughts and writings with the look of substantial culture.
To awaken is to see our work as embarrassing or ridiculous. To
awaken is to leave the scholarly community, to slip out of the recep-
tion hall and into the twilight.
If the Court writes well, following the guidance of Hart and
Wechsler,38 we sleep soundly. If it writes somewhat badly or does
somewhat disturbing things, we dream and impose order. But there
are times when the Court slaps me awake and I can no longer carry
out the task of organizing the material into frameworks. Butler v.
McKellare9 gave me insomnia. The Court had announced in Teague v.
Lane that "new rules" of constitutional law could no longer provide the
basis for relief at the habeas stage,4 and, in Butler, the Court gave a
shockingly broad meaning to "new rule"-so that any rule not clearly
established at the time the conviction became final, any rule still
subject to reasonable debate, could no longer be considered on ha-
beas.41 My dream-state view of the matter was that a "new rule" of
constitutional law could not exist, short of a new amendment to the
37. This model of dreaming is not Freud's but Hobson's. See J. Allan Hobson, The
Dreaming Brain (Basic Books, 1988).,
38. For a discussion of the Legal Process conventions reflected in the Hart and Wechsler
book, see Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 691 (cited in note 27); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on
the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 953 (1994); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity
Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. Rev.
609, 619-29 (1991).
39. 494 U.S. 407.
40. 489 U.S. 288. There are two rarely applicable exceptions. See id. at 311-13.
41. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415.
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Constitution,4 or at least that rights evolve steadily and rarely burst
forth in a manner recognizable as "new."41 But Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote:
[Tihe fact that a court says that its decision is within the "logical compass" of
an earlier decision, or indeed that it is "controlled" by a prior decision, is not
conclusive for purposes of deciding whether the current decision is a "new
rule" under Teague. Courts frequently view their decisions as being
"controlled" or "governed" by prior opinions even when aware of reasonable
contrary conclusions reached by other courts.44
Notice that Chief Justice Rehnquist openly takes the position
that the Legal Process methodologies are a scam. Butler sent a jolt
through the dreaming professorial synapses, and many articles re-
sulted, demanding a return to the various frameworks that various
authors had propounded over the years.
It is the violence underlying all of this posturing that causes
my insomnia.45 Butler dies. The Court performs a balancing test in
such a way that Butler's impending death is never put in the scales.
Only the neat, pristine matters of federal interest (the workload of the
federal courts) and state interest (finality) are weighed. It seems
repellent to fall back into the Federal Courts dream under the circum-
stances. The academy's strange remove from risky, dangerous human
life should unsettle us. I won't say we stand apart from real life-I
acknowledge that this too is life-but we lead a life nearly immune
from the "distinct and palpable"4 injuries that befall the characters in
the cases we read. They are not fictional characters, though as we
read about them we sit in the same comfy chairs we sit in when we
read novels. They genuinely suffer and frequently die, slipping
through the fictional web of doctrine upon which we train our eyes.
The field of Federal Courts has a particular tendency to inten-
sify the alienation of the academic. Endlessly we contemplate complex
doctrinal frameworks, capacious, wavery abstractions like federalism,
and perverse axioms like "avoid unnecessary questions of constitu-
42. This is, of course, the originalist position. See, for example, William H. Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976) (rejecting the notion of a 'living
Constitution").
43. This is standard Legal Process thinking. See, for example, Butler, 494 U.S. 407, 417
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 415.
45. The classic discussion of the violence of adjudication is Robert M. Cover, Violence and
the Word, 95 Yale L. J. 1601 (1986).
46. The Court uses these conventional adjectives to denote injuries substantial enough to
provide a litigant with standing to sue in federal court. See, for example, Worth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
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tional law." And yet, in the background, clamoring for our psychic
attention are Adolph Lyons, choked nearly to death by Los Angeles
police, 47 and Horace Butler, sent to his death by a state that had the
good fortune to deny him a lawyer before the Supreme Court an-
nounced a minute extension of law that squared precisely with the
issue in his case.4 The outside world leaks messily onto our intellec-
tual frameworks. Procedure is not pristine.
How should we respond?
We may redouble our efforts to construct intellectual frame-
works that account for the suffering and violence that lies behind the
intricate doctrines we analyze and critique. Or we may grow weary of
our distance and rebel at the thought of composing another traditional
article. We may drag on, spurred by the need for tenure, the repre-
sentations we made when we applied for the grant, or even the impul-
sive acceptance of a speaking engagement once shrouded in the haze
of.the future and now imminent.
And here I am, having accepted this speaking engagement and
agreed to tell the weary travellers what direction we ought to take for
the future. I am deeply embarrassed at the presumptuousness and
arrogance inherent in standing up here as a consequence of agreeing
some time ago to play the role of prophet! I rather wish someone
would tell me the true direction and give me some ideas. After all, if I
knew the future destination, I'd be home pounding out the articles,
making my reputation by getting there first, not helping the competi-
tion. But I want to reclaim humility by stating that I do not think
that a true direction exists, that in the past we made the mistake of
believing we were engaged in building monuments to the truth, and
that our weariness now comes from the unavoidable recognition that
the project is futile. I would like to promote diversity as a replace-
ment for belief in true direction. It is, I argue, not only a more appro-
priate expression of the way we understand law today (as opposed to
in the fifties and sixties) but a much more exciting and interesting
approach to writing and teaching.
The course in Federal Courts is the starting point for the schol-
arship. Through the course Hart and Wechsler defined our field, and
through the course we continue to have the power to define and rede-
fine it. I think the course is a ground for ongoing experimentation.
Teaching Federal Courts generates ideas for writing about Federal
Courts, although for the most part it is only these finished, polished,
47. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
48. Butler, 494 U.S. 407.
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often bloated or over-edited articles that we share with each other.
Only our students participate in the lively ongoing experimentation
with ideas, and we may have no colleagues at our schools who know
much of anything about the issues we want to debate. Being a proc-
ess-oriented person, as Federal Courts scholars tend to be, I want to
recommend not necessarily more articles about the judicial process
but a scholarly process, designed to overcome the tedium of the usual
articles, to open to each other the vital debate that tends to occur only
at the teaching level, and to take advantage of computer technology.
IV. ABANDON FOUNDATION: EXPLORE CYBERSPACE
I invite you to throw aside the oversized, overpriced, blue
pebble-textured object manufactured by Foundation Press, the pub-
lishing company pretentious enough to contribute to my architectural
metaphor. Choose the forty or so cases you feel most stimulated
teaching. Delete the parts that bore you. Delete any footnotes you
don't absolutely love. Put them in an order that seems interesting,
productive, likely to generate new thinking. Put the digitalized mate-
rial on the computers in your library and let the students download it
onto their own discs for free. Laserprint and xerox copies for students
who want hard copy (it will cost a third of what a casebook costs, or
less). As you teach, type in your notes and questions after the
cases--continually write next year's text. At the end of the semester,
reshuffle the cases as new connections occur to you. Add to your mix
of cases. You can put in all the new Supreme Court cases each year
and, after the next semester, delete the ones that did not stimulate or
produce new insights. You may find that the order you choose for the
cases is quite different from the one conventionally chosen in Hart and
Wechsler and the casebooks that follow its model.
I should confess that I have never taught from the Hart and
Wechsler casebook, though it was the choice of my Federal Courts
professor (Larry Sager) when I took the course in the Spring of 1981.
I rejected it out of hand in the Fall of 1984 when I began teaching: the
Third Edition49 had yet to appear and there was not even a current
supplement for the Second Edition.5w I used Martin Redish's book,51
49. Paul M. Bator, et al., Hart and Wechler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
(Foundation, 3d ed. 1988).
50. A book missing the 1983 and 1984 cases-Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89; Long, 463 U.S. 1032; and
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95-was absurdly out of date.
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which was more up to date and followed the Hart and Wechsler model,
in shorter form. I later switched to Low and Jeffries,52 again because
it was new-it also came with the promise of an annual supple-
ment-and had the familiar Hart and Wechsler organization in a
shorter form. Why did I not take on the Third Edition of Hart and
Wechsler when it appeared in 1988? I felt it was too overloaded with
information to serve the students well.3 Note that it is famously
intimidating even to teachers.5 One can so easily reach the point in
Federal Courts where the students become outraged and almost
incredulous about the amount of doctrine. In teaching the course, I
try to draw students into the ideas and rhetoric and methodologies
used by the Court in dealing with the large topics of federalism, sepa-
ration of powers, and constitutional rights. I try to give them juicy
cases and chewable doctrine-chunks so they can be up and "talking
Federal Courts" quickly. The doctrinal overload-the endless note
cases obsessively adding one little twist after another-represses
debate. It suggests to the students (not to mention the teachers) that
they can never know enough to have an opinion worth listening to.
So I recommend devising a manageable, big-idea-oriented
course, tailored to your own interests and insights.55 Experiment.
Must Marbury5 come first? Must we always begin with The Man and
His Commission? Most students have been milled through Marbury
in Con Law by the time they get to us and may not reread it or have
51. Martin H. Redish, Federal Courts: Cases, Comments, and Questions (West, 1st ed.
1983).
52. Peter W. Low and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-
State Relations (Foundation, 1987).
53. Professor Mullenix noted in 1989 that the Third Edition of Hart and Wechsler was the
longest casebook available on the market. See Linda S. Mullenix, God, Metaprocedure and
Materialism at Yale, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1139, 1140 n.7 (1989) (reviewing Cover, Fiss, and Resnik,
Procedure (cited in note 34)).
54. See Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 690 (cited in note 27).
55. Compare Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender. Women, Jurisdiction, and the
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1682, 1735-36 (1991) (criticizing the canon of cases generally
covered in casebooks for their exclusion of feminist issues). I appreciate assaults on the canon
and critiques based on exclusion that are aimed at existing packaged, commercial materials. I
have engaged in one myself, albeit in the field of Evidence. See Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman,
the Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 914
(1994). I think the greatest contribution to packaged Federal Courts materials would be a
concerted effort to forefront the effect of race on the case law. I say this because I think it is
apparent that race has influenced the history of Federal Courts doctrine, beginning (at least) with
the frequently wilfully avoided Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859) (asserting a strong
federal power against a state court that found the Fugitive Slave Law unconstitutional). See Hart
and Wechsler, The Federal Courts at 380 (cited in note 8) (using the later Tarble' Case, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 397 (1872), to illustrate the doctrine established in Ableman). While I appreciate
attacks on published materials, those centralized compendia of conventionalism, I want to
emphasize the liberation of decentralization in composing one's own materials.
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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much patience with its historical and legal complexities. Can you
plunge into Federal Courts without the classic aphorisms? 57 Would
putting federalism before separation of powers jog some new thinking?
Although I sometimes begin with Marbury, lately I've started
with Monroe v. Pape,5 for several reasons that appeal to me at the
moment:
1. It has an immediate, timely context capable of stirring pas-
sion:
13 Chicago police officers broke into [the Monroes'] home in the early morn-
ing, routed them from bed, made them stand naked in the living room, and
ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress covers....
Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on "open"
charges for 10 hours, while he was interrogated about a two-day-old
murder. ... he was not taken before a magistrate, though one was accessible,
. . . he was not permitted to call his family or attorney . . . he was
subsequently released without criminal charges being preferred against
him.
59
2. It connects jurisdictional questions with the enforce-
ment of individual rights.
3. It conveys an urgent sense of the desirability of federal
courts: students tend to see why Monroe would want to use the
federal and not the state courts to sue the Chicago police in 1961.
4. It forces students to consider a statutory text (42 U.S.C. §
1983) with a distinct and important legislative history (Reconstruction)
that will inform their understanding of federalism.
5. It brings the issue of race immediately to the foreground
and makes it a standard topic for discussion throughout the course.
6. It forces students to think about the relationship be-
tween substantive and procedural law, because Section 1983 exists in
a gray area between substance (it grants no rights but provides a
vehicle for asserting rights) and procedure (it does not grant jurisdic-
tion, but its interpretation has a powerful jurisdictional effect).
7. Through a comparison of Justice Douglas's majority
opinion and Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, it introduces the
central debate about whether federal courts should be regarded as the
primary enforcers of the rights of individuals or whether state courts
57. For example: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,' id. at 177; '[A] government of laws not of men," id. at 163; and "The very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury." Id.
58. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
59. Id. at 169.
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carry out the primary function, with federal courts serving as a back-
stop, activated by state court failure.
Monroe reveals the complexity of jurisdictional problems and
the rhetoric they generate. Here we find strong statements in favor of
judicial activism, phrased in terms of respect for statutory texts and
the intent of a Congress ninety years in the past, with the conspicuous
absence of any reference to the civil rights movement of the present.
And we find judicial restraint, from a Justice (Frankfurter) who pur-
ports to be deeply concerned about present-day governmental abuse
("Modern totalitarianisms have been a stark reminder . . .,"60), de-
fended in compelling functional terms:
Federal intervention, which must at best be limited to securing those minimal
guarantees afforded by the evolving concepts of due process and equal protec-
tion, may in the long run do the individual a disservice by deflecting respon-
sibility from the state lawmakers, who hold the power of providing a far more
comprehensive scope of protection. Local society, also, may well be the loser,
by relaxing its sense of responsibility and, indeed, perhaps resenting what
may appear to it to be outside interference where local authority is ample and
more appropriate to supply needed remedies.61
I do not present any of these ideas as necessary or correct, and
I do not stigmatize either of what I call the "federal court primacy
position" and the "state court primacy position." Instead, I strive to
get as many ideas out on the table as I can, to develop many strands
of discussion, and to enable the students to "talk Federal Courts."
I follow Monroe with Dombrowski62 and Younger v. Harris.6 I
used to go right to Younger, because of its distinct contrast with
Monroe. Younger draws its federalism not from Reconstruction, but
from the founding period, expressed in that wonderfully obtuse and
naive-sounding line, "one familiar with the profound debates that
ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect
those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of 'Our
Federalism."'64 Younger has the fine disclaimer-to be referred to
again and again throughout the course--of "blind deference to States'
Rights."65 And it displays a normative vision of federalism that has
some appeal with or without the originalist pedigree:
60. Id. at 209 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 243.
62. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
63. 401 U.S. 37(1971).




the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways ...
[Federalism,] a system in which there is a sensitivity to the legitimate inter-
ests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights
and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.66
But by the third time through the materials, I found I had
come to rely on Dombrowski so much in explaining Younger that I
decided to insert it, even though it would blunt the contrast between
Monroe and Younger. Moreover, Dombrowski introduces the voice of
Justice Brennan, whose vision of the federal courts permeates the case
law.6 7  His position stands in important contrast to that of Justice
Frankfurter, who, in my present set of materials, is the most promi-
nent voice for judicial restraint and deference to the states.
Dombrowski keeps the issue of race in the forefront. It involves a
striking pattern of abuse by Louisiana state officials in the form of bad
faith prosecutions and threats of prosecution against civil rights work-
ers.68 It sets up a jurisdictional problem-whether federal courts
should rescue federal rights claimants from state court proceed-
ings-in a context in which intervention seems particularly compel-
ling, and it creates the impression that perhaps federal courts will
take up such intervention as a matter of course. This impression is, of
course, dispelled in Younger, where we learn that deference to state
courts is "the normal thing to do."69
Dombrowski and Younger also present an introduction to ideas
about who may invoke the federal courts' power, an issue that will
thread through the course. Justice Brennan, in Dombrowski, encour-
ages litigation to explore the meaning of constitutional rights. He
develops the overbreadth doctrine and remarks that "[i]f the rule were
otherwise, the contours of regulation would have to be hammered out
case by case-and tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal
prosecution."70 Younger, on the other hand, boots out for lack of stand-
66. Id.
67. Justice Brennan also wrote the majority opinion in the other central Warren Era
federal courts cases, Baker, 369 U.S. 186; Fay, 372 U.S. 391; and Henry, 379 U.S. 443; and has
written major dissenting opinions on many of the federal courts issues handled controversially by
the later Courts. See, for example, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)
(Eleventh Amendment); Teague, 489 U.S. 288 (habeas corpus); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (federal question jurisdiction); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984) (standing).
68. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 482.
69. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45.
70. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487.
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ing a number of plaintiffs who want to challenge California's Criminal
Syndicalism Act.7 Farrell Broslawsky, the Los Angeles Valley College
history instructor who felt "inhibited" in "teach[ing] about the doc-
trines of Karl Marx or read[ing] from the Communist Manifesto," is a
memorable character who sticks with us as a symbol of the sort of
person a restraint-bound Court will not tolerate. Even John Harris,
Jr., prosecuted under the California statute, will not be rescued from
the "cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a
single criminal prosecution." 3 Rights claimants will have to be "hardy"
after all.
Younger, to my way of thinking, leads directly to Mitchum.7 4
Mitchum reasserts the strong Reconstruction Era vision of the need
for federal courts and seems, at least initially, to be squarely at odds
with Younger. It presents the questions why the Court in Younger
would create a freestanding, judge-made doctrine when an explicit
statute appeared so clearly to govern and why the Court would make
the all-but-laughable intepretation that Section 1983 implicitly
"expressly authorize[s] " 75 an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. I
love the juxtaposition of Younger and Mitchum and love these ques-
tions in part because I think there is an utterly sensible answer (in a
word: Dombrowski76) and in part because they force the students to
resolve their perplexity by developing a theory of how the Court "does
jurisdiction."
The sequence of my introductory chapter, which is not the
slightest bit inevitable, continues with:
0 Moore v. Sims,7 which shows the applicability of the Younger
doctrine to civil proceedings, introduces the possibility that the chal-
lenged state law might serve a higher value (here, protecting children)
71. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41-42.
72. Id. at 39-40.
73. Id. at46.
74. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
75. Id. at 243.
76. In my view, the Court would not tolerate a flat ban on all injunctions of ongoing state
proceedings because it would undercut a core aspect of the role of the federal courts, enforcing
federal rights when state courts are inadequate. Its intolerance was so strong that a clear statute
could not stop it from making jurisdiction what it thought jurisdiction should be. The Court still
did not think that federal courts should routinely enjoin state court proceedings, however, for
state courts on the whole should shoulder the work of enforcing federal rights that arise within
their own proceedings. The Younger doctrine as a judge-made doctrine could be tailored to the
distinction between state courts that deserved deference and those that did not. See Ann
Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction Law, 40 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 1035, 1039-51 (1990).
77. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
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than the federal rights used to challenge it7a and raises questions
about the context in which courts ought "to say what the law is."79
The Simses brought a classic survey-the-statute-book complaint: one
can argue that this is good, because it produces a swift announcement
of what rights exist, or that it is bad, because it forces the court to de-
termine the law in an overly abstract context. The Sims Court's rejec-
tion of broadly framed litigation contrasts nicely with Dombrowski
and leads to the most profound questions about how the meaning of
rights should develop. Is the incremental, evolutionary mode ideal?
a Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Companyo picks up
a key thread from Sims: if the federal court proceeds to hear the at-
tack on state legislation, it will have to interpret the state statute, and
the interpretation will never be reviewed by the authoritative state
court.81 Pullman introduces a second abstention doctrine, 2 confronts
us with a fact pattern involving racial discrimination, and gives us a
second dose of Frankfurterian rhetoric.3 Again, the notion of shaping
78. The challenged Texas Family Code created a procedural structure designed to protect
children from abusive parents. The father in the case appears almost certainly to have been
abusive, since one of the children was hospitalized for eleven days after an incident that occurred
at the child's school. Id. at 419. The parents objected to the state's procedures under the federal
Due Process Clause. Id. at 422.
79. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. Note how this question connects to the issue of what
is "new law" in Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990). I follow Sims in my current draft with a
long quote from Justice Scalia's provocative article, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1175 (1989). Scalia disdains the incremental approach and would like to structure
jurisdiction (at least Supreme Court jurisdiction) to maximize the opportunities for propounding
broadly applicable rules. Id. at 1185-87. I think the Scalia article is especially useful in'
forestalling simplistic conclusions about the "liberal" and "conservative" approach to jurisdiction.
80. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
81. Id. at 499-500.
82. I do not bother with any abstention doctrines beyond Younger and Pullman, other than
a brief note on Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976),
because, to me, they overload the course with indigestible complexity. On the other hand, if one
wanted to cut back somewhere else, an extended exploration into all the forms of abstention
doctrine could be very productive. Certainly, one positive value of a book like Hart and
Wechsler's is that it allows a teacher to select from a huge range of cases. The book is so long that
one is forced to select from the whole. This may lead you to think that all the cases you would
want to cover are already in the book and thus you need only construct an original syllabus with
page citations to the classic casebook. In fact, I began with this premise, only to find that half of
the cases I wanted to cover in full were not printed as full cases. Moreover, editors necessarily
edit their cases down: you may find that casebook editors have omitted the very language that
connects the cases for you. The process of accumulating the cases yourself differs in many other
ways from the process of cutting back from someone else's materials. It is inherently more
constructive (yes, the building metaphor) and thus more likely to stimulate your creative
processes. One's attitude tends to be different. Instead of thinking: what can I afford to cut?
must I really give them all this? can I really expect them to digest all these note cases?, you
think: will this case contribute to the experience I want my students to have this semester? No
casebook editor preparing materials for a commercial publisher is going to think like this.
83. 'Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor
than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies." Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500. The first
dose, of course, was the Monroe dissent.
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the context for "say[ing] what the law is" can be explored: if there is
"undoubtedly... a substantial constitutional issue,"" why wouldn't a
federal court have a duty to face up to it, and not be cowed by the
"sensitive area of social policy"85 and the potential for "rigorous con-
gressional restriction" of judicial power?
* Hawaii Housing Authority v. MidkiffP7 presents a nicely prag-
matic contrast to Pullman. Justice O'Connor refuses to be bamboo-
zled by the lawyers' characterization of the state law question as am-
biguous (and thus warranting Pullman abstention). Moreover, like
Sims, Midkiff shows us a state that, while it may challenge the limit
of what the federal Constitution permits, seems to be doing something
good-and remarkably progressive (redistributing land).M At this
point, students can see that Pullman abstention is "the exception and
not the rule" though Younger abstention remains "the normal thing to
do." I like to ask them why this should be the case, in part because I
think there is a good answer to that question.89
• City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,90 like Monroe, presents an appall-
ing example of police brutality.9 1 It makes the question of race un-
avoidable as it elaborates the requisites of standing doctrine, a topic
begun in Younger and Sims, and provokes inquiry into whether juris-
dictional doctrine operates covertly, essentially deciding the merits.
Lyons also presents a puzzling suggestion that federalism values
counsel against enjoining the police chokehold: I use this to explore
the notion of deference, contrasting deference to a court with deference
to a police department.92
* Stone v. Powel 93 throws habeas corpus into the mix and re-
turns to the context of unreasonable searches and seizures, the issue
84. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 501.
87. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
88. Id. at 232-34.
89. The "normal thing" is to stay with a single case and to assume that the court handling
that case can do a good enough job of dealing with any law applicable to it; the exceptional thing is
to litigate on two fronts or to assume a court cannot deal with law other than its "own" law.
Younger avoids two cases and assumes state courts can deal with federal law. 401 U.S. 37.
Pullman faces two cases and assumes federal courts cannot deal with state law. 312 U.S. 496.
90. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
91. Id. at 98 (discussing a police chokehold that had caused a number of deaths, used even
in the absence of a threat of severe bodily harm).
92. This is an issue that recurs in Butler when the Court refuses to intrude on a judge who
makes a "reasonable" assessment of what the applicable law is and analogizes this refusal to the
.good faith" immunity accorded police enforcing an invalid search warrant. See Butler, 494 U.S.
at 14-15. More can be, or should be, expected of a court than the police.
93. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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in Monroe. Because Powell, unlike Monroe, was prosecuted,94 he had,
albeit unwillingly, already made a trip through the state court system.
So the question becomes, do federal rights claimants have some sort of
entitlement to a hearing in federal court? Do federal rights only take
their proper scope when a federal judge says what they are? Two
alternatives are presented: one ought to be able to relitigate in federal
court (still the general rule on habeas95) or relitigation ought to take
place only when the state court has failed (the exception to the rule for
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims).96
0 Allen v. McCurry97 completes the point made in Stone.
McCurry refuses to create a special exception to collateral estoppel for
Fourth Amendment claims brought under Section 1983, which, be-
cause of Stone, escape federal habeas corpus review 5 References to
Reconstruction's transformed version of federalism fail. Even though
a rights claimant making the initial forum selection can choose federal
court under Monroe,99 there is no entitlement to federal court once the
state court has already acted.
0 Preiser v. Rodriguez °° ends my first chapter, heightening a
number of ideas about federalism. Like McCurry, it shows the inter-
action between Section 1983 and habeas corpus. This claim for the
return of a prisoner's "good time" credits, which the state had revoked
as a punishment for possession of contraband,1°1 would have fit liter-
ally into either statutory vehicle. Why is the rights claimant forced to
use habeas corpus, and thus to bring his claim in state court first
pursuant to the habeas exhaustion requirement? Isn't the exhaustion
requirement inapplicable on the ground that it reflects the assumption
that the rights claimant will have been in front of a state court judge
at the time the alleged violation occurred?
I feel that, as a teacher, it is not my place to resolve matters
into a coherent framework. I consider such an approach boring, if not
domineering. I like to think of Federal Courts as "Shakespearean."
Only a bad playwright would have one character (the playwright's
94. Compare id. at 469 (concerning a habeas petitioner convicted of murder in state court
who challenged a police search that produced substantial evidence) with Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169
(concerning a § 1983 damages claim against police who conducted a search in which no evidence
was found and consequently no prosecution followed).
95. See Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993); Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
96. Stone, 428 U.S. 465 (presenting the question of whether the state court offered a "full
and fair opportunity to litigate").
97. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
98. Id. at 103-05.
99. Id. at 98-99.
100. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
101. Id. at 480-81.
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mouthpiece) spout all the good, insightful lines and make everyone
else a foil. Shakespeare remains vital because he did not have an
overt political agenda, and he did not suppress conflict and complex-
ity. Similarly, Federal Courts is an arena of human behavior, a con-
vergence point for all sorts of vital ideas, a forum for ongoing debate.
The cases and doctrines represent human aspirations, foibles, absurd-
ity, generosity, empathy, detachment, weariness, idealism. The
judges are characters, the litigants characters, and we too are charac-
ters. This is my outlook now. If I search for an architectural meta-
phor, I picture a grand hotel-I'll call it the Hart and Wechsler
Hotel-a place through which anyone may pass, carrying intriguing
narrative and conceptual baggage. Happy to observe and interpret
the transient characters, I have lost interest in building any perma-
nent structures for them.
Let me take my approach to casebook-making a step further, in
a direction that aligns with my affinity for decentralization and multi-
plicity. I have not discussed my materials here because I think they
represent the best ordering of the cases, but because they represent a
liberating experiment. There are times when I find this experiment so
exciting that I want to share it with others, but whenever I think of
transforming it into a marketable product I am forced to admit that
what is so exciting and natural to me may well seem perverse, alien,
and confusing to someone else.102 In any event, to organize it for mass
production, to bind it in a conventional blue or brown hardcover,
seems to miss the point. What I like about my materials is their per-
sonal quality, tailored to my idiosyncratic array of insights, my level of
toleration for complexity, and my love of role playing (I tend to do
monologues in the personas of Justices Brennan, Frankfurter, and
many more). I like the mutability of a book on computer disc. I like
the casual quality of a looseleaf.y°3
We should view commercial casebooks as obsolescent, to be
replaced by computer technology, particularly for the course that is
one's primary field of research. Traditional casebooks can serve as
"training wheels" for new teachers, until they have the experience to
gather their own materials together as described above. But the
radical step would be to build up a database of teaching materials on
the Internet. As we experiment with different cases, questions, and
102. For a discussion of the commercial pitfalls of innovative casebooks, see Laura Kalman,
Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960 (U. of N.C., 1986); Mullenix, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1139 (cited in note
53).
103. Of course, Henry Hart, when tempered with Albert Sacks instead of Herbert Wechsler,
liked a looseleaf too. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Cambridge, Mass., Tentative ed., 1958).
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materials, we should share the results, and respond to each other,
incrementally building up a resource that each of us can download,
customize, use, edit, add to, and ultimately upload. The cases are in
the public domain, why should anyone make a profit selling them?
Law review authors seem quite willing and eager to grant permission
to reprint excerpts of their articles. And why should we compulsively
horde the various insights that we use in class? Shouldn't the future
Federal Courts construction project take place in cyberspace? Instead
of waiting for each other to produce a bloated, over-edited article
(which we may copy and then never read), we should link up in the
lively forum that technology has now made possible. Our colleagues'
lack of interest in our "arcane" field could become a nonissue.
V. ABANDON MONUMENTS: WRITE ESSAYS
Teaching and the continual composing of teaching materials
create a fertile ground for your ideas-your ideas, the ideas that genu-
inely reflect your background, knowledge, and inclinations. Instead of
hewing to the narrowly procedural or propounding fully formed nor-
mative theories and lambasting the Court for failing to adhere to
them, move-to a more easy-going level, admitting into your thought
processes any relevant information or ideas, any substantive law that
occurs to you, any evidence about history, society, science, or any
conceivable theory from another discipline. Abandon the outmoded
project of constructing primly reductionist frameworks and demanding
that doctrines be designed to fit these frameworks. Stop stultifying
your creativity with a mindnumbing sense of obligation to read all the
articles that everyone else or everyone else who seems important has
ever written. You will probably never write anything genuinely read-
able and you will probably never genuinely enjoy writing unless you
read widely,104 use what you know, and stop censoring yourself. Write
essays that play with ideas, not in an attempt to show everyone the
way, but in the spirit of inclusion and ferment, not to control what
others may say or what courts may do, but simply to enrich and en-
liven our impoverished field.
104. To quote Doris Lessing again:
There is only one way to read, which is to browse in libraries and bookshops, picking up
books that attract you, reading only those, dropping them when they bore you, skipping
the parts that drag--and never, never reading anything because you feel you ought, or
because it is part of a trend or a movement.
Lessing, Introduction to The Golden Notebook at xix (cited in note 1).
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The sense that Federal Courts is dead comes from our life-
suppressing method of scholarship. I still believe that Federal Courts
is fertile territory, full of richness and complexity. It is a bustling
hotel full to capacity with all sorts of interesting characters and their
ideological baggage. It is the location of a crisis point in the law,
where we can see procedure, structures, and the most profound mat-
ters of individual rights, social conditions, and political choices in a
state of conflict. I have come to see Federal Courts this way from
teaching, from restructuring my course in opposition to the conven-
tional compartmentalization, from writing things that my nagging
internal critic denounces as "sententious," and from "read[ing my]
way from one sympathy to another, learning to follow [my] own intui-
tive feeling about what [I] need."105
Of the many Federal Courts articles I have written, the one
people talk to me about is the one I wrote after giving up a steady diet
of standard Federal Courts articles and began reading whatever books
caught my attention, often reading only parts, and always suspended
in the middle of reading dozens of books at a time. °6 Reading in this
way, I often felt derelict in my duties-after all, I had stacks of xer-
oxed articles in my office I had never read. To assuage my work-ethic
guilt, I constantly assured myself that any reading counts as work.
While most of these books had no noticeable relationship to Federal
Courts or even the law, other than the fact that I, a Federal Courts
person, had chosen them, I frequently found places to cite them in my
articles, and I felt that I gained by exposure to things capable of shift-
ing my mind in some surprising way.
I don't say any of this to recommend myself, but to recommend
the process. I offer this Essay, imperfect as it is, as an example of
something I would like to read: a personal analysis of my connection
to Federal Courts, a confession of my own psychic ties to issues of
structure, and my own tendency to contemplate the substance of
rights from the comfortable distance jurisdictional doctrine provides.
Are we not human beings, who weave our own personalities into the
material we compose? Do you never feel alarmed when you think of
your life of involvement with concepts like unripeness, restraint, and
abstention? Do you never crack a smile at your own behavior as you
devise a framework of reason designed to demonstrate that the
Supreme Court of the United States is confused? Do you never arm-
chair-psychoanalyze the writers whose work you read? I invite con-
105. Id.
106. Ann Althouse, Standing, in Fluffy Slippers, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1177 (1991).
1016 [47:993
1994] LATE NIGHT CONFESSIONS 1017
fession and personal narrative: how did you come to entertain and
embrace the ideas to which you are now wedded?
Write "essays" instead of "articles." This is not mere label-
switching. Calling what you write an essay can bring you into touch
with its character as a personal expression, its immediacy, and can
make you more aware of its literary quality. An essay is something
readable and provocative, not a turgid authoritative disquisition in-
tended to prove what a learned, unassailable authority figure you
turned out to be. If you are a pompous windbag, if you write bad
prose, be embarrassed. If you find yourself reading the bad prose of a
pompous windbag, have the self-respect to throw it aside. Feel some
sense of responsibility to the ongoing dialogue about Federal Courts.
It can be invigorating and we all can participate. I heartily forgive
anyone who writes a turgid authoritative disquisition in order to get
tenure (but don't expect me to read it). But to those of you who have
won academic freedom: exercise it.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
As indicated in the text of my Essay, I use my own materials,
consisting of edited text of the cases cited below, accompanied by my
original text, notes, and questions.
I. CHAPTER I: CLAIMING FEDERAL RIGHTS IN A SYSTEM OF
FEDERALISM
A. The Model of Federal Court Primacy-Asserting Federal
Rights in Federal Court: Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
B. Refusing to Defer to the State Court: Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
C. The Competing Model of State Court
Primacy-Abstention and Deference to the Adequate
State Court: Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
D. Eschewing State-Based Deference-A Preference for
Federal Courts or a Preference for Judge-made
Jurisdiction Doctrine?: Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
(1972).
E. Deference to State Courts/Deference to State Legislation:
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
F. Avoiding Unnecessary Questions of Constitutional
Law/Avoiding "Needless Friction" with State Policies:
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496
(1941).
G. Deciding Questions of Constitutional Law and Avoiding
Abstention: Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229 (1984).
H. Standing and Federalism-based Equitable Restraint:
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
I. Habeas Corpus and Deference to the Adequate State
Court: Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
J. Do Federal Rights Require Federal Courts?: Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
K Section 1983, Habeas Corpus, and the Question of
Federal or State Court Primacy: Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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II. CHAPTER 2: CLAIMING FEDERAL RIGHTS IN A SYSTEM OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. The Role of the Judiciary "to say what the Law is"-
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1804).
B. Ripeness-An Early Take on the Right of Privacy: Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
C. Standing, Reapportionment, and the Warren Court:
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
D. Standing, School Desegregation, and the Burger Court:
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
E. Mootness-An Early Take on Affirmative Action:
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
F. Recent Debate on Mootness: Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305
(1988).
G. Standing in the United States Supreme Court:
ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
H. The Power of Congress to Affect Standing: Lujan v.
Friends of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1991).
III. CHAPTER 3: JURISDICTION IN CASES "ARISING UNDER"
FEDERAL LAW
A. The Supreme Court and the State Courts: Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
B. Congressional Control of Federal Court Jurisdiction:
Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1851).
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
C. Should Congress Expand the Federal Judiciary?
D. The Constitutional Meaning of "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction:
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1825).
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
E. The Statutory Meaning of "Arising Under" Jurisdiction:
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804 (1986).
F. The Role of the State Courts:
Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990).
In the Matter of Sherman M. Booth, Supreme Court of
the State of Wisconsin, June Term 1854.
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858).
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IV. CHAPTER 4: THE CONUNDRUM OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. Background: Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1794).
B. Theories of Interpretation: Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1 (1890).
C. The History of a Legal Fiction: Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908).
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984).
D. The Power of Congress to Abrogate State Immunity:
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
E. The Effect on State Courts: Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S.
58 (1989).
V. CHAPTER 5: STRUCTURING THE CONTEXT FOR "SAYING WHAT
THE LAW IS"
A. Habeas Corpus Review of the Rights-Limiting State
Court-Part I: Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
B. Supreme Court Review of the Rights-Limiting State
Court: Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
C. Supreme Court Review of the Rights-Expanding State
Court: Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
D. Habeas Review of the Rights-Limiting State Court-Part
II: Coleman v. Thompson, 59 U.S.L.W. 4789 (June 24,
1991).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
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